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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 920439-CA

v.
Priority No. 2

ALFRED LEE O'NEIL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Alfred Lee O'Neil appeals his conviction on
three counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance,
first degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a) and -(l)(b) (Supp. 1992).

This Court has jurisdiction by

virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1992), whereby an
appeal from a first degree felony conviction may be transferred
to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court

transferred this case by order dated July 9, 1992.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court Properly Admit Evidence of

Defendant's "Other Bad Acts,19 Under Rules 404, 403, and 609, Utah
Rules of Evidence?

Admissibility of evidence under Rule 404

appears to present a question of law, reviewed without deference
to the trial court.
(Utah App. 1991).

See State v. Tavlor, 818 P.2d 561, 568-71

Rules 403 and 609 both require the trial court

to weigh probative value against the prejudicial effect of
evidence; thus the
State agrees with defendant that appellate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

review of this process entails a deferential, "abuse of
discretion" standard.

See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232f 239

(Utah 1992) (Rule 403); State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295-96
(Utah App. 1990).

Cf:. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3

(Utah 1991) ("Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a
question of law, and we always review questions of law under a
correctness standard").
2.

Where the Evidence of Defendant's Prior Conviction

was Excluded at his First Trial, which Ended in a Mistrial, Did
the Trial Court, with a Different Judge Presiding, Properly Admit
that Evidence at Defendant's Second Trial?

This issue

essentially addresses the authority of one district judge to set
aside the "law of the case" decided by another.

As set forth

more fully in the body of this brief, this should be considered a
matter of trial court discretion, and be afforded deference on
appeal.

See, e.g., Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc.,

692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984) ("law of the case" doctrxne is
subject to several exceptions).
3.

Did the Trial Court Correctly Deny Defendant's

Motion, at His Second Trial, to Recuse the Trial Judge and
Replace Him with the Judge who had Presided over the First Trial?
The denial of a recusal motion is reversed on appeal only upon a
showing of actual bias, or if the trial court abused its
discretion.

State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah), cert.

denied, 108 S. Ct. 2876 (1988); State v. Ontiveros, 189 Utah Adv.
Rep. 9, 11 (Utah App. June 22, 1992).
2
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident•
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides in
pertinent part:
General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during crossexamination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant . . ..
The text of other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules
pertinent to this appeal will appear in the body of this brief.

3
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was first tried jointly with his wife, Peggy
O'Neil, on three counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled
substance (R. 98). The counts were based upon three December
1990 methamphetamine sales directly consummated by Peggy O'Neil;
defendant was charged as an accomplice, see Utah Code Ann. § 762-202 (1990) (R. 5-8). Peggy O'Neil was found guilty; however,
the jury deadlocked as to defendant, resulting in a mistrial
ruling on the charges against him (R. 103-04).
A new trial was set for defendant alone (R. 139). The
State moved in limine to admit evidence of defendant's and Peggy
O'Neil's prior, 1987 convictions on similar charges, along with
evidence that defendant had been incarcerated at the Utah State
Prison on such charges from 1987 through 1990.

This evidence had

been excluded, on defendant's motion, at the original joint trial
(R. 99, 121). The judge in the new trial, not the same judge who
had presided over the joint trial, granted the State's motion to
admit the evidence (R. 159-60).

This pretrial success prompted

the State to press forward with the new trial (R. 105).
The new trial resulted in guilty verdicts on all three
distribution counts (R. 291-93).

By virtue of defendant's prior

conviction, these verdicts amounted to first degree felonies
under Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a) and -(l)(b) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence supporting defendant's guilt is fairly
straightforward.

A confidential informant, P.H., made three

4
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

controlled methamphetamine buys from Peggy O'Neil inside Woody's
Bar in Moab, during early December 1990 (T. 2/27/92 at 67, 71-72,
101; 75-78; 81-85; 185-86).

Twice, defendant was actually inside

Woody's, watching P.H. "very closely" as the sales were completed
(id. at 78, 83). P.H. was convinced that defendant actually saw
the exchange of drugs for money during one of the buys (.id. at
124-25, 127). Defendant was also positively identified driving
Peggy O'Neil to or from Woody'8 in his brown Thunderbird at the
time of two of the sales (id. at 71, 148-49, 153). The
Thunderbird was in the vicinity on all three occasions (id., and
id. at 181, observing male driver and female passenger).
P.H. admitted that a month or so after the controlled
buys, he began buying methamphetamine for his own personal use
(T. 2/27/92 at 102). He made one such purchase on credit from
Peggy O'Neil; shortly thereafter, P.H. testified, defendant
attempted to collect that debt for his wife, telling P.H. to pay
for the methamphetamine as soon as possible (id. at 103-05).
As permitted upon its pretrial motion in limine, the
State introduced evidence of defendant's 1987 conviction and
incarceration for drug distribution (T. 2/28/92 at 252-55).
Peggy O'Neil's concurrent 1987 conviction, and the fact that she
had been charged jointly with defendant in that case, was also
revealed (id..; State's Exh. H, at Attachment A to Record on
Appeal).

This showed defendant's awareness of, and involvement

in, his wife's past criminal activity, supporting the State's
argument that defendant had intentionally aided her in the

5
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December 1990 methamphetamine sales (T. 2/28/92 at 280-81)•

The

jury was also urged that defendant's presence in Woody's bar
during two of those sales, and his effort to collect the drug
debt from P.H., belied his testimony that he had been an
unwitting bystander to Peggy O'Neil's crimes (id. at 282-84).
The jury returned unanimous guilty verdicts (T. 2/28/92
at 310-11).

Defendant was sentenced to three concurrent, five-

to-life terms at the Utah State Prison (R. 309).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Evidence of defendant's prior conviction was properly
admitted under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.

This Court,

the Utah Supreme Court, and the clear weight of authority all
hold that such evidence is admissible where, as here, it is used
to show intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake with respect to
the charges at hand.

The trial court also properly found that

under Rule 403, the probative value of the evidence was not
"substantially outweighed" by opposing concerns. And although
defendant's past conviction was not primarily admitted to impeach
his credibility, it did fall within the time guidelines to make
such use permissible, and again, it was sufficiently probative to
outweigh concerns about unfair prejudice.
The judge at defendant's second trial was not bound by
the first trial judge's order ruling defendant's prior conviction
inadmissible.

Defendant relies too heavily on his "law of the

case" argument; that doctrine has legitimate exceptions, and is
not compelling here.

Because this was defendant's second trial,
6
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the inadmissibility ruling at the first trial was not binding;
further, different considerations at the two trials justified the
different evidentiary rulings.

Reconsideration of evidentiary

rulings, as happened here, should always be permissible, for it
allows trial courts to correct their own errors.
It appears that defendant's "judge substitution"
complaint is merely his evidentiary ruling complaint in a
different guise.

He did not properly pursue his request to

change judges in his second trial, for he did not follow the
procedures set forth in Rule 29, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, for judge recusal.

He makes no showing that the

presiding district court judge exceeded his authority to assign
cases as deemed fit in light of judge workloads.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S AND HIS WIFE'S PRIOR
CONVICTIONS AND OTHER BAD ACTS WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED AT DEFENDANT'S SECOND TRIAL.
Defendant first complains that evidence of prior
convictions, and evidence that he demanded payment of informant
P.H.'s drug debt after the charged offenses took place, was
improperly admitted against him.
A.

These complaints fail.

Proper Admission of Prior Convictions.
Admissibility of defendant's and his wife's prior

convictions was competently addressed in both parties' memoranda
to the trial court (R. 106-37).

The State spelled out that it

wished to use the prior convictions, as permitted by Rule 404(b),
7
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Utah Rules of Evidence, for the purpose of showing defendant's
knowledge of his wife's drug dealing and, in turn, knowledge that
his wife went to Woody's bar intending to sell illicit drugs (R.
110).

The State also argued that the prior convictions showed a

common scheme to the December 1990 offenses, that is, that
defendant and his wife acted together (R. 112-13).l
These were proper bases for admission of the evidence.
Such "other crimes" evidence is admissible for purposes not
related to the accused's character, "such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident."

Utah R. Evid. 404(b).

This

portion of Rule 404 is an "inclusionary" rule, that admits "all
evidence of other crimes relevant to an issue at trial except
that evidence that proves only criminal disposition."

State v.

Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991) (emphasis added),
following State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989),
and State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983).
In Tanner. the Utah Supreme Court traced the
development of Rule 404(b) (then Rule 55), and noted that the
rule's construction as one of inclusion dates back to 1947.

675

P.2d at 546 (citing State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d 1016
(1947)).

In Taylor, this Court noted the overwhelming approval

of "other crimes" evidence both generally and, as here, in drug
prosecutions, 818 P.2d at 569-570 (citing authorities).

Here,

*The State also believed that the prior offense had taken
place at Woody's bar (R. 113); however, at trial, defendant denied
this (T. 2/28/92 at 253).
8
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the evidence was relevant to defendant's knowledge and intent as
an accomplice to drug dealing; it did not show "only" criminal
disposition.

Thus the trial court, relying on Tavlor (R. 138),

correctly admitted it under Rule 404.
This Court held in Tavlor that Rule 404 alone may not
compel admission of "other crimes" evidence, and that the
"probative versus prejudicial" weighing of Rule 403, Utah Rules
of Evidence should also be done, 818 P.2d at 571.

Defendant,

however, misconstrues Rule 403, arguing that it compels exclusion
of relevant evidence upon a mere "likelihood that it will be
unfairly prejudicial" (Br. of Appellant at 5).

In Tavlor, this

Court held that to be excluded under Rule 403, the probative
value of the challenged, relevant evidence must be substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused, 818
P.2d at 571 (quoting the rule, emphasis partly in original).
Here the trial court ruled that evidence of the past
convictions was not substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice (R. 156). As a matter of trial court
discretion, this ruling should be honored on appeal.
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992).

See State

The ruling is not

"beyond the limits of reasonability," jld. Therefore, this Court
should affirm it even if it might have ruled differently, had it
been presiding over the actual trial.2
2

It is worth noting that under Rule 403, the trial court
rejected other evidence proffered by the State. That evidence was
defendant's possession of valuable "collectibles" and electronic
equipment in his home, even though he did not seem to have much
income. The trial court ruled that this information tended to

9
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Further, in Taylor, this Court noted that Rule 403
weighing may consider the State's need for the challenged
evidence, 818 P.2d at 571. Here such need was demonstrated by
the inability of the first trial jury to reach a verdict on
defendant.

His guilt turned on accomplice liability, and thus,

in turn, upon whether he intentionally aided his wife in the
illegal transactions, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990).

The

first jury evidently deadlocked on this question, even though it
presumably heard about defendant's close proximity during the
methamphetamine sales in Woody's bar.

This shows that evidence

of defendant's and his wife's other similar activities was needed
and admissible under Rule 403.
While not seriously pursued on appeal, defendant also
argued in the trial court that his prior, 1987 convictions were
irrelevant to the alleged 1990 drug transactions (R. 126).
However, defendant was incarcerated for the 1987 offenses until
shortly before the December 1990 drug sales (T. 2/28/92 at 25455).

Thus, but for his incarceration, it seems that defendant's

involvement in illegal drug sales was effectively continuous,
such that the similar 1987 offense was relevant to the question
of his involvement in the 1990 offense.
Defendant also complains that the prior convictions
were inadmissible under Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence.

That

rule allows admission of past convictions, subject to certain
restrictions, to impeach a witness's credibility.

The State

confuse the case with collateral issues (T. 2/27/92 at 96-97).
10
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cited the rule as an alternative basis for admitting the prior
convictions, but the trial court relied solely on Rules 404 and
403 in admitting them (R. 115, 157).
This Court should hold that admissibility of the prior
convictions was controlled by Rules 404 and 403, without reaching
the Rule 609 impeachment question.

Indeed, in State v. Morrell,

803 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1990), this was done:

even though the

defendant's past conviction was improperly admitted under Rule
609(a)(2), it was held properly admitted under Rules 404 and 403,
803 P.2d at 295-96.

Further, here, as in Morrell, id. at 295,

defendant's prior convictions constituted necessary substantive
evidence of defendant's criminal intent, and were not merely
evidence of a propensity to lie. Accordingly, Rules 404 and 403
are more specifically applicable, and control this issue.

See

State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 737-38 (Utah App. 1990), and cases
cited therein (where more than one provision might apply, the
more specific provision governs the dispute).
Even considering the merits of defendant's Rule 609
argument, it should be rejected-

First, defendant's prior

conviction fit the seriousness and recency requirements of Rule
609(a)(1) and (b). Next, defendant testified at trial, and
professed unawareness that his wife was selling drugs during the
December 1990 trips to Woody's bar (T. 2/28/90 at 245-46).
Further, defendant attacked the State's key witness, the
informant P.H., with his own history of drug abuse and his
alleged failure to pay rent on his living quarters, arguing that

11
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P.H.'s testimony was not credible (T. 2/27/92 at 107-110; T.
2/28/92 at 291-92).
Construing Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence, dealing
with the impeachment use of other bad acts not resulting in
convictions, this Court squarely held that a criminal defendant
cannot attack the character of prosecution witnesses and
simultaneously expect that he or she will be immune from such
attacks.

This, the Court observed, "would be a mockery of our

justice system . . .."

State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah

App. 1991).
The foregoing principle in Reed, relying on Utah
Supreme Court and this Court's precedent, properly applies to
Rule 609 admission of prior convictions for impeachment purposes.
Rule 609(a)(1) contains a "probative versus prejudicial effect"
weighing requirement that appears more defendant-favorable than
that of Rule 403. However, this requirement should be construed
to allow a weighing in favor of admissibility, when a defendant
assails the State's witnesses as untruthful.

Reed suggests this

is a matter of fairness, and it is legitimately so.

Defendant

here attacked the credibility of the State's key witness.

It is

reasonable to hold that he thereby opened the door to his own
impeachment, to the effect that his disclaimer of participation
in his wife's drug sales was itself incredible.
B*

Proper Admission of Later Bad Act.
Defendant also complains of error in the admission,

through the testimony of P.H., of evidence that some time after
12
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the December 1990 methamphetamine sales in question, defendant
"dunned" P.H. for payment of a later-accrued drug debt.

This

evidence, too, was admissible under Rule 404(b).
It does not matter that the "dunning" incident occurred
after the December 1990 drug transactions for which defendant was
tried.

In United States v. Bibo-Rodricruez, 922 F.2d 1398 (9th

Cir.), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 111 S. Ct. 2861 (1991), the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed
that federal Rule 404(b), identical to the Utah provision, deals
with "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" (emphasis added), without
regard to whether such acts occurred prior to or after the acts
constituting the charges in issue, 922 F.2d at 1400.3 Thus
Bibo-Rodriguez's admissions to drug transportation, engaged in
after the incident for which he was at trial, were held properly
admissible against him, id. at 1401-02.
A virtually identical situation is presented here.
Defendant denied involvement in his wife's drug dealing,
portraying himself as an "innocent dupe," as did Bibo-Rodriguez,
922 F.2d at 1400 (T. 2/28/90 at 245-46).

His attempt to collect

a drug debt for his wife squarely contradicts this, showing his
complicity in her criminal conduct.

Again, because it was

relevant to defendant's liability as an accomplice, this episode
was properly revealed at his trial.

interpretations of federal rules are persuasive authority for
construing identical Utah rules. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,
1333-34 (Utah 1986).
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Defendant's defense theory centered on his purported
unawareness of his wife's criminal activity, even in his very
presence.

That defense theory legitimately allowed the State to

introduce evidence of other acts tending to refute it.

State v.

Brown. 577 P.2d 135, 136 (Utah 1978) ("The very nature of
defendant's theory of the case points out that his contention of
error is without merit"); State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1165
(Utah 1980) (other acts need not themselves be criminal).

The

trial court did not err in so ruling.
POINT TWO
THE "OTHER BAD ACTS" EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED AT DEFENDANT'S SECOND TRIAL, EVEN
THOUGH IT HAD BEEN BARRED AT THE FIRST TRIAL.
Defendant next argues that the "other bad acts"
evidence should have been inadmissible under the "law of the
case" doctrine, because the judge who presided over the first,
joint trial refused to admit them.

That isf the judge at his

second trial lacked power to "overrule" the first judge's
decision.
A.

This argument fails.
Inapplicability of "Law of the Case" Doctrine.
First of all, defendant relies too much on the "law of

the case" doctrine.

The term most commonly applies to legal

issues in a given case that have been decided on appeal: those
issues generally will not be redecided if the case, after remand,
is again appealed.

Further, the doctrine is a rule of general

policy, not on the compelling level of res judicata or stare
decisis.

5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 744 (1962).
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Accord

Conder v, A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987)
(refusing to revisit prior Utah Supreme Court ruling in same case
on "law of the case" ground, but citing authority, id. at 636,
that doctrine is not "an inexorable command").
Even where "law of the case" describes the rule that
one judge will not overrule the decision of another, co-equal
judge in the same case, see State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125, 1129
(Utah 1989), the rule is one of general guidance only/

It is

subject to a variety of exceptions, falling under the general
rubric of a change in "relevant circumstances" following the
earlier judge's ruling.

Lamper, 779 P.2d at 1129.

In fact, the

"law of the case" doctrine generally insulates an earlier judge's
ruling from reconsideration by a second judge only if no such
change in circumstances occurs.

See, e.g., Sittner v. Big Horn

Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735 (Utah 1984) (second judge was
presented with no new evidence to justify changing first judge's
decision); State v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44 (Utah 1982) (second judge's
order reversed because, independent of "law of the case," it was
legally erroneous); State v. Morgan, 527 P.2d 225 (Utah 1974)
(second judge's order reversed because first judge's order, then
pending on appeal, was held to be legally correct).
Indeed, in Lamper, the Utah Supreme Court held that it
was error for a second district court judge, citing "law of the
4

Indeed, the doctrine has been described as an advisory rule
in the federal courts. E.g., 20 A.L.R. Fed. 13, 17-20 (1974) ("the
general rule is more properly expressed in such terms as that a
judge should not overrule or reconsider the previous decision or
order of another judge" (emphasis in original)).

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

case," to not reconsider a prior judge's evidentiary ruling in
the same case, 779 P.2d at 1129-

The law had changed since the

prior ruling, trumping the Mlaw of the case," Id.

Further, this

Court has noted that the "law of the case" doctrine, applied in
the unyielding manner advocated by defendant, would improperly
prevent trial courts from correcting their own errors.
Willard, 801 P.2d 189, 190 n.l (Utah App. 1990).

State v.

Accord Griffin

v. Dana Point Condominium Ass'n, 768 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (N.D.
111. 1991) ("The law of the case does not demand obsequiousness
right or wrong" (quoting authorities)).
In sum, the "law of the case" doctrine does not bar
reconsideration of legal rulings during the pendency of a case;
indeed, the sound exercise of discretion sometimes requires such
reconsideration.

Just as the same judge may properly reconsider

his or her earlier rulings, a subsequent judge in the same case
should also be allowed to do so.
B.

Chanced Circumstances Justifying New Ruling.
Here changed circumstances supported the second trial

judge in admitting the "other bad acts" evidence against
defendant.

One such circumstance was the fact that defendant,

previously given a mistrial, was facing an entirely new trial.
In a very real sense, then, the earlier ruling barring this
evidence was not even a part of the case in defendant's second
trial:

that ruling was binding only upon the joint trial, which

had been concluded.

Further, prejudice to defendant's wife, no

longer a co-defendant, was not a concern at the second trial.
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The State made this point when it sought to introduce the other
bad acts at the second trial (R. 131-32).
A second changed circumstance, also shown by the State,
was the lack of full briefing of the "other bad acts" question
before the first, joint trial.

Defendant's motion to bar that

evidence was only presented on the first day of that trial; the
State was unable to fully research the issue (R. 69-73, 129-30).
In fact, defendant's motion was untimely under Rule 12(b)(2),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (motions on admissibility of
evidence must be made at least five days before trial):
received a "gift" when the judge even considered it.

he

Further, as

set forth in Point One, it can be argued that the first judge
erroneously barred the evidence.

It was therefore certainly

proper, upon the State's timely motion, and full briefing by both
parties, to admit the "other bad acts" evidence at defendant's
second trial.
No rational legal principle entitled defendant to
preserve, to his benefit, a questionable legal ruling made at his
first trial.

The "law of the case" doctrine does not compel such

a result, and the "other bad acts" evidence against defendant was
properly admitted at his second trial.
POINT THREE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE JUDGE AT
HIS SECOND TRIAL WAS PROPERLY DENIED.
Defendant finally complains that the judge who presided
at his second trial should have been disqualified, and that the
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first trial judge should have presided over the second trial as
well.5

This complaint fails.
First, defendant's disqualification motion was

procedurally inadequate.

He did not allege that the second trial

judge was biased, much less file an affidavit to that effect, as
required under Rule 29(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

He

raised no "colorable claim" that the second judge should have
been recused for bias, see State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094
(Utah), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1220, 108 S. Ct. 2876 (1988).
Accordingly, that judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing
to disqualify himself.

See State v. Ontiveros, 189 Utah Adv.

Rep. 9, 11 (Utah App. June 22, 1992) (judge recusal motions
reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Defendant's disqualification

motion was no more than an attempted intrusion upon the authority
of the district court's presiding judge to assign cases as he or
she sees fit.
Administration.

See Rule 3-104 (3)(E)(ii), Utah Code of Judicial
It was properly rejected by the trial court.

Defendant's analogy to substitution of counsel, while
creative, is wide of the mark.

Counsel, of course, acts as an

advocate, seeking at every turn to achieve ei favorable trial
outcome for the client.

The judge's duty is to preside

impartially over the matter, serving the truthfinding process,
not necessarily to the benefit of either party.

In short,

5

The first trial judge was Judge Halliday, then a circuit
court judge temporarily assigned to the district court because of
Judge Bunnell's unavailability.
Judge Halliday was appointed
permanently to the district bench after the first trial, but Judge
Bunnell presided over the second trial (R. 175-77).
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defendant's interest in retaining the same advocate for his
defense is far stronger than that in retaining a particular,
neutral judge.

Rules governing changes in the former do not

govern the latter.
Further, even if defendant could retroactively apply
Rule 29A, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to this case, it
would not aid him.

By its terms, the rule requires that "notice

of change" of the trial judge be served on the court, not on the
parties.

Indeed, such notice is filed only when "all parties

joined in the action . . . by unanimous agreement" decide to
change judges.

No such agreement occurred here.

Finally, defendant was put on notice of the new judge
assignment some three months before his second trial (R. 105).
He did not protest that assignment until long after that judge
granted the State's motion to admit the "other bad acts" evidence
barred at the original trial (R. 159-60, 171-72).

Defendant's

belated disqualification motion thus looks suspiciously like an
attempt to set aside an unfavorable evidentiary ruling, by
replacing the judge who made it.

If this is correct, defendant

was "forum shopping," an enterprise the "law of the case"
doctrine is designed to discourage.

See 20 A.L.R. Federal 13,

17-20 (1974) (discussing policy bases for "law of the case"
rule).

Accordingly, his judge disqualification motion was

properly denied in the trial court, and that denial should be
affirmed on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
As set forth above, the trial jury found defendant
guilty of criminal conduct, upon properly admitted evidence,
before an impartial judge. Accordingly, his convictions should
be affirmed.
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